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Abstract
This paper evaluates the extent to which private, non-subsidised cooperative
agreements in R&D by EU firms has evolved, paying particular attention to the
extent to which economic integration may have influenced intra-EU activity relative
to extra-EU agreements (i.e., EU-US and EU-Japan alliances) over the period 1980-
1994. Essentially, EU firms’ partnering habits reflect the need to seek strong partners
regardless of nationality within a given industry, although intra-EU partnering
enjoyed a brief popularity during the latter half of the 1980s.
Keywords: Single European Market; R&D collaboration; strategic alliances
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Introduction
The single European market (SEM) initiative, through its various stages of economic coop-
eration until the establishment of the European Union, can be said to be one of the most im-
portant socio-economic developments of this century. At the heart of much of this activity has
been a belief that cooperation by institutions and firms across the various European countries
represents a means by which the technological and economic gap between the US and Europe
after the Second World War might be narrowed. As Peterson (1991) has pointed out, although
technological collaboration has constantly remained high on the agenda of European policy
makers, policy makers have systematically developed pan-European R&D activities only
since the 1980s. Several initiatives by the European Commission have been implemented over
the past two decades in an attempt to bolster the competitiveness of European firms, particu-
larly in high technology sectors.
In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which private (i.e. non-subsidised) cooperative agree-
ments in R&D by EU firms have evolved, paying particular attention to the extent to which
economic integration may have influenced intra-EU activity relative to extra-EU agreements
(i.e. EU-US and EU-Japan) over the period 1980-1994. Given the crucial nature of technology
development to the competitiveness of firms, we wish to enquire whether in fact the SEM ini-
tiative has had a significant effect on the propensity of EU firms to collaborate in R&D type
activities, with special attention to information technology, new materials and bio-technology.
Our analysis is somewhat anecdotal and qualitative, and utilises data from the MERIT-CATI
database, which contains records of over 10,000 instances of strategic technology partnering
(see the appendix). Essentially, EU firms’ partnering habits reflect the need to seek strong
partners regardless of nationality within a given industry, although intra-EU partnering en-
joyed a brief popularity during the latter half of the 1980s. While the SEM has been judged to
have affected the structure of European industry through a general restructuring of European
industry to exploit economies of scale through rationalisation, this has brought limited im-
provement in the competitive position of European industry.
Explaining cross-border activity and European integration
The SEM initiative has been judged to be reasonably successful, in terms of encouraging in-
tra-European economic activity - at least in terms of trade and FDI - although there have been
some reservations expressed about the qualified nature of these gains, given the inter-relation
between the two.  For instance, there has been an increase in trade in particular sectors that are
sensitive to non-tariff barriers that were to be scrapped by 1993, as firms have sought to im-
prove their efficiency through the rationalisation of production in order to achieve economies
of scale. However, as Hughes (1992) has argued, US and Japanese firms have been equally
well positioned as EC firms to exploit the SEM initiative. She points out that the only way
firms can take advantage of scale economies is by the relocation and readjustment of produc-
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tion activities, something which US and Japanese firms have also undertaken in response to
the SEM initiative. Indeed, as numerous studies have shown1, there has been a growing
amount of FDI inflows during the run-up period to 1993 as non-EU firms have established (or
consolidated) their presence within the EU. They have done so partly in the fear of a ‘fortress
Europe’, but also to exploit potential benefits of a single market of 300-odd million consum-
ers.
In terms of FDI, Dunning (1997a, 1997b) in a survey of inward FDI into the EU, concluded
that:
1. FDI into the EC since the early 1980s has grown faster than in most other parts of the
world;
2. the geographical and industrial distribution of inward FDI stocks have changed to reflect a
certain level of rationalisation, with the more labour intensive aspects moving to the pe-
riphery (Portugal, Spain and Greece); and with the bulk of technology and information
sensitive sectors remaining in the ‘core’ countries of the EU;
3. intra-EC FDI and Japanese FDI inflows have outpaced US inward FDI. He also observed
that overall, the spatial distribution of production activities has not undergone a major
shift.
The current paper aims to throw some light into the third area that has been expected to pro-
mote the growth of intra-EU economic activity, that of industrial collaborative activity, or
strategic alliances. In particular, we focus on understanding the behaviour of a rather impor-
tant subset of cooperative agreements, that of strategic technology partnering (STP).
By strategic alliances we refer to inter-firm cooperative agreements which are intended to af-
fect the long-term product-market positioning of at least one partner (Hagedoorn 1993).  In
this paper we are specifically interested in strategic technology alliances where innovative
activity is at least part of the agreement.
What make this line of enquiry important and topical? The contra argument to this line of
analysis lies in the fact that in general, while production activities have gradually been in-
creasingly internationalised, there has been relatively little internationalisation of R&D (see
e.g., Patel and Pavitt 1991, Dunning and Narula 1995, Archibuigi and Michie 1995). On the
pro side, it is worth noting that there has been some growth in the technological development
activities of MNEs relative to its level 20 years ago, and these changes have resulted in two
trends worth of noting.  First, in addition to overseas R&D activities associated with demand
side factors, there has been a growing extent of foreign R&D activities by firms in response to
supply-side factors (Florida 1997, Kummerle 1997).  Second, there has been a growing use of
external or quasi-external technological sources. Tidd and Trewhella (1997) suggest that the
most important external sources of technology are universities, consortia, licensing, customers
and suppliers, acquisitions, joint ventures and alliances and commercial research organisa-
tions. Although there is little systematic and thorough analysis of this process, companies
such as Phillips and Akzo-Nobel are currently attempting to externally source 20% of their
technology needs (van Hoesel and Narula 1998).  Indeed, there is a direct relationship be-
tween how much R&D a firm does internally, and its external acquisition of technology.
Veugelers (1997) demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between external technol-
ogy sourcing and internal R&D. Indeed, indications are that collaborative arrangements to
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9undertake R&D are becoming ever more popular, having tripled in significance since the
early 1980s (Gugler and Pasquier 1996).
Furthermore, the European Commission through its framework programme has encouraged
R&D collaboration by public and private EU based institutions, significantly relaxing its pro-
hibition on anti-competitive agreements where they are related to technology development
(Urban and Vendemini 1992). In addition, under the auspices of programmes such as
ESPRIT, RACE, BRITE and BRIDGE, it has provided considerable subsidies to collaborative
R&D.
Although it is clear that there has been something of an explosion in the propensity of Euro-
pean firms to undertake strategic alliances, to what extent can this be attributed or explained
by the SEM initiative? Can we apply our understanding of European integration as applied to
trade and FDI to explain collaboration in general, and R&D cooperation in particular?
Explanations for the growth in collaboration
It is especially difficult to delineate the various reasons for the growth in intra-European FDI
and trade, particularly those to do with the SEM initiative from other factors such as those as-
sociated with globalisation. In addition, the phenomena under discussion are dynamic and
complex, and as such are fraught with complex interdependencies. Nonetheless, underlying
reasons for much of the growth may be summarised as being due to the reduction in the tariff
and non tariff barriers between European countries and the harmonisation of laws and the
subsequent free(er) movement of good and people across borders. It is possible, at the risk of
oversimplifying, to suggest there are two sets of highly inter-related and co-dependent expla-
nations, firstly from a transaction-economics perspective, and secondly from a strategic per-
spective.
Integration as a reduction in transaction costs
To what extent can this inter-disciplinary framework be an explanation for the growth of in-
ter-firm collaboration? It might be argued that the harmonisation of regulations across borders
makes coordination and monitoring costs of cooperative agreements lower, thereby making
quasi-internalisation through collaboration a more cost-effective option than had previously
been the case. In general, it might be argued that these transaction costs reductions accrue to a
greater extent to intra-EU alliances, than to extra-EU agreements. However, as implied by
Hughes (1992) and Ramsay (1995), many of the major foreign-owned MNEs already present
(and in many cases, firmly embedded) in the EU economy would accrue the same benefits as
EU firms. As Narula and Hagedoorn (1997) have shown, there are no significant country-
specific differences in the propensity to engage in alliances. Nonetheless, it might be argued
that, ceteris paribus, greater absolute cost-reductions might occur for EU firms since the ex-
tent of their European value added activity is generally higher and the significance of their
European operations much larger to their total world-wide activity. This reasoning might sug-
gest that ceteris paribus, EU firms should derive a larger benefit when engaging in collabo-
ration with other EU firms as a result of European integration relative to non-European
firms.
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However, while reduced transaction costs might lead firms which otherwise might have con-
sidered full internalisation to undertake collaborative agreements, this assumes that these
firms were already interested in international expansion. Firms that might not have had the
resources to engage in overseas activity on their own, would now also be able to consider it,
since a collaboration could require fewer resources than it might otherwise have done before
integration. In other words, this line of reasoning would suggest that ceteris paribus, the num-
ber of firms undertaking alliances within the EU would have increased since the 1980s in re-
sponse to integration. However, it is important to note that there is a strong causality between
size and the propensity to engage in STP, given the need to have sufficient resources to un-
dertake R&D.
Evolving motives for collaboration
A second line of reasoning has to do with the change of strategy of firms in response to inte-
gration.  The primary reasons why firms undertake collaborative activity in the first place
have, on balance, not changed substantially. Successive surveys of the literature have resulted
in a near-taxonomy of motives for alliances (see e.g., Hagedoorn (1993), Dunning (1993),
Glaister and Buckley (1996)), and can be summarised as being to:
1. improve appropriability of innovation
2. improve access to markets
3. Co-opt and block competition
4. reduce rising costs/risk of innovation
5. seek complementary assets
It would seem logical to argue that European integration has (or should have) eliminated the
need to undertake alliances for motive (2) and to a lesser extent, motive (1)2.  On the other
hand, motives (4) and (5) have become increasingly important as these are global phenomena,
while open markets may have aggravated the use of motive (3), since firms are obliged to re-
structure to strengthen or even maintain their competitive position, either through aggressive
or defensive means. Indeed, such a restructuring of EU industry has occurred since the early
1980s in response to the impending single market agreement (Dunning 1997a). Much of the
EU-subsidised R&D programmes was aimed at achieving this renewed competitiveness, and
indeed, was undertaken in earnest by most firms with a view to being able to compete on
equal terms with other EU firms as well as US and Japanese firms by 1993. To what extent
then, can it be argued that they may have effected intra-EU alliances relative to EU-US alli-
ances or EU-Japan-alliances? Narula and Hagedoorn (1997) show that firms display similar
STP behaviour within a given industry regardless of their nationality. We should therefore
expect to see a growth of intra-EU alliances as 1993 approaches, as well as a growth in EU-
US and EU-Japanese alliances as these firms too will be interested in consolidating their
global position, and a decline thereafter.
However, an alternate and contrary approach is taken in research by Ramsay (1995) Kay
(1991) and Kay, Ramsay and Hennart (1996) who argue that in fact the restructuring of EU
industry favours other fully-internalised modes of activity such as mergers and acquisitions
(M&A). Furthermore, intra-EU agreements would not be popular since market entry post
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1992 is barrier free in all directions, potential partners would also be potential competitors. In
their view, firms from outside the EU would be relatively more inclined to undertake collabo-
rative agreements. This argument is based on the assumption that collaborative activity is a
device of last resort, and that firms engage in joint ventures primarily to achieve market entry.
However, there are two points that cause umbrage: First, the assumption that collaborative
arrangements are devices of last resort. This in fact, is arguably no longer the case, as we are
entering what Dunning (1995) has termed the age of alliance capitalism.  In many cases, alli-
ances represent a first-best option (Ciborra 1991), particularly where quick response to dy-
namic conditions is called for. This is especially true of alliances that involve technology de-
velopment (Hagedoorn 1993). However, it should be pointed out that their analyses focused
entirely on joint ventures, and not on strategic alliances. Second, there is the explicit assump-
tion that firms undertake joint ventures in order to enter markets. As we have highlighted
above, this is only one of the motives for alliances, and in the case of STP, a relatively unim-
portant one.
Examining the evidence.
What are the trends of European firms in undertaking strategic technology partnering? Figure
1 is a plot of the number of newly established STP agreements by regional pairings. For in-
stance, in the case of European-Japanese STP, we count how many alliances contain at least
one Japanese and one European partner. The data shows that in the case of intra-EU alliances,
between 1980 and 1984, there was a total of 270 alliances, and over the proceeding 5 years
this number almost doubled to 534.  Between 1990 and 1994, the level of intra-EU partnering
dropped to its pre-1985 extent. In the case of EU-US alliances, the trend is somewhat differ-
ent. Although there was a sharp increase in transatlantic partnering activity in the mid-1980s,
the level of this activity (on an aggregate basis) continued unabated until 1993, with a sharp
increase in the latest year. In the case of EU-Japanese alliances, the level of activity has re-
mained at more or less the same level over the entire 15-year period for which data is avail-
able. Table 1 examines the trends for the UK, France and Germany and shows the change
over time in their alliance activity with the seven most significant industrial countries of part-
ner firms between 1980 and 1994. These trends tell a similar story.
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Figure 1: Number of new STP per year by EU firms, 1980-1994
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Figure 2: STP by EU firms, by core sectors and regional groupings
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Table 1: STP by German, UK and French firms
STP by German firms with companies from: 1980-84 85-89 90-94
UK 9 29 21
France 11 26 21
Netherlands 10 25 16
Italy 5 13 7
USA 51 108 163
Japan 22 33 41
STP by UK firms with companies from: 1980-84 85-89 90-94
Germany 9 27 18
France 10 31 24
Netherlands 9 27 8
Italy 5 13 8
Japan 117 159 121
USA 69 139 140
STP by French firms with companies from: 1980-84 85-89 90-94
Germany 9 24 21
UK 10 31 24
Netherlands 5 24 15
Italy 14 17 14
Japan 23 27 27
USA 58 69 100
Source: MERIT/CATI database
What do these data imply? First, that European industry began to undertake a much
more serious view of alliances in the mid-1980s, with a doubling of activity over a
short period. This can be in part be attributed to three things. First, that the process of
economic integration had by this time been seen to be a reality. Second, European
firms had begun to realise by the mid-1980s that they were technologically lagging in
new core high technology sectors such as information technology, and leading Euro-
pean firms had begun to cooperate by this period (Mytelka and Delapierre 1987,
Mytelka 1995). This cooperation in R&D was further enhanced by encouragement
from the European commission around this same period, with the commission estab-
lishing a ‘Big 12 roundtable’ to develop proposals for new collaborative R&D proj-
ects (Peterson 1991). Although our data excludes information from EU-subsidised
projects, the availability of funds through the establishment of EU subsidised R&D
programmes  (which expanded to include other non-IT national champions which
were major consumers of IT products such as Volvo, Aerospatiale and Volkswagen)
further enhanced the intra-EU collaborative efforts of European companies. It is in-
deed no coincidence that the launch of the EC’s framework programme and Eureka
occurred around the same time as the surge in alliance activity. In other words, Euro-
pean firms, driven by the need to improve their competitive position in the face of
increasing competition on a global basis, sought to improve their technological ad-
vantages through collaboration, a process which was further encouraged through fi-
nancial and legal support from the European Commission. It is worth noting that it is
exceedingly difficult for governments to determine, where R&D collaboration is
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concerned, which projects within a large company’s research portfolio actual benefits
from the R&D subsidies (Narula and Dunning 1998).
Third, given the realities of the SEM initiative, the need to become competitive
within the European context required a certain level of restructuring on the part of
the various individual EU firms. Although while Kay, Ramsay and Hennart’s (1996)
argue that intra-EU collaboration was inhibited because potential partners are also
potential competitors, the fact is that this is also one of the primary attractions of
partnering:  strategic partnering also affords firms a chance to (temporarily) pre-empt
competition, in addition to allowing the to evaluate the capabilities of the partner
firm. Indeed, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1993) found that over the period 1980 to
1989 the subsidised R&D networks and private R&D networks were started almost
simultaneously, and that the intensity of private R&D cooperation could be predicted
by the intensity of subsidised R&D cooperation.
The subsequent decline of the number of new alliances in the 1990s, in our view re-
flects the result of re-structuring of European industry, in part through the series of
M&A that occurred in the run-up to the single market (e.g., Nixdorf by Siemens, ICL
by Fujitsu, Plessey to Siemens-GEC) as well as the re-positioning of firms’ techno-
logical profiles (e.g., the exit of Philips from computers, its entry of the telecommu-
nications sector with AT&T) (Mytelka 1995).
The second reason for the decline in intra-EU alliances may have to do with the
growth of extra-EU alliances. As table 1 and figure 1 both show, the propensity for
EU firms to engage in alliances with Japanese and US firms also increased in the
mid-1980s. This reflects in part the desire for Japanese and US firms to seek strategic
positions within European industry prior to 1992 to avoid any question of being ex-
cluded from ‘fortress Europe’. In addition, there had been some attempt to spur
transatlantic R&D cooperation though the strategic defence initiative (SDI) pro-
gramme of the US government in the mid 1980s (Carton 1987). Perhaps most sig-
nificant of all, however, was that EU firms were primarily spurred to partner with US
and Japanese firms given their technological lead that US firms possessed, in infor-
mation technology and bio-technology, and to a lesser extent new materials, while
Japanese firms had a technological lead in information technology and new materi-
als. In other words, EU firms would be interested in partnering with firms regardless
of nationality, depending primarily on their relative competitive positions in the in-
dustry, or the presence of significant clusters at given locations. Figure 2 (above)
shows trends in STP by the three core technological areas- biotechnology, informa-
tion technology and new materials for which data is available, further subdivided by
geographic groupings. EU firms prefer to engage in transatlantic STP, particularly in
sectors such as biotechnology where there is a considerable technological gap with
the US. Two other reasons come to my mind as plausible explanations. First, the de-
cline in the number of new intra-EU agreements may be because the rules regarding
the participation of non-EU firms in EU-subsidised consortia was relaxed. Second, as
suggested by Mytelka (1995) in relation to the European IT sector, the EU ‘big 12’
failed to act in a orchestrated way, due to a lack of consensus on strategy.
This relates to our earlier discussion on the motives for STP since firms are often en-
gaged in partnerships to access resources that they are unable to acquire as easily by
going it alone. These resources may be either firm specific or even location specific,
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associated with the national systems of innovation of a region or a country. For in-
stance, centres of agglomeration of economic activity exist, and firms may wish to
collaborate with other firms located there, in order to accrue externalities that derive
therefrom. More importantly, however, companies will prefer to partner with tech-
nology or market leaders, regardless of where they might be located, or what their
nationality is.  Furthermore given the increasing tendency for the cross-fertilisation
of technologies, firms prefer to collaborate than develop a simultaneous expertise in
several seemingly unrelated technologies. A second aspect of motive is that firms
may simply engage in alliances to so-opt a competitor. It is well known, for instance,
that firms do not always have recourse to patenting as a means to protect new and
rapidly evolving technologies, and must rely on secrecy or by co-inventing with po-
tential competitors (Levin et al 1987).  In other cases, by co-invention, firms are able
to determine that they will jointly have ‘won’ the race to innovate (Narula and Dun-
ning 1998). Other less R&D-specific reasons also exist.  For instance, Veugelers
(1996) notes that European firms are more active in alliances in industries in which
they lack a comparative advantage, but are more defensive in sectors where they
have a comparative advantage. Furthermore, weak EU firms actively seek strong
partners, and strong EU firms ally with weak partners. Given that most of the EU
firms in the bio technology and information technology sector do not enjoy a signifi-
cant competitive advantage, it is not surprising therefore, that a majority of STP by
these companies are with Japanese and US firms.
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Conclusions
Although the SEM initiative has been judged as a qualified success as far as FDI and
trade are concerned, relatively little has been said about strategic technology alli-
ances, an area in which the European Commission has explicitly sought to promote.
Although our conclusions are somewhat similar to those proposed by Kay, Ramsay
and Hennart (1996), both our analysis and explanation are different.  Our analysis
suggests that the single European market did not achieve the objective of the frame-
work programme: Closer cooperation among European firms in undertaking coop-
erative R&D. While intra-EU cooperation did in fact increase during the second half
of the 1980s, this level was not sustained through the early 1990s. Instead, EU firms
have shown a continued propensity to undertake EU-US and EU-Japanese R&D
collaboration, particularly in the information technology, biotechnology and new
materials sectors. This is perhaps not surprising, for at least 3 reasons.
First, EU firms are idiosyncratic in nature, and have distinct technological trajecto-
ries. Cooperative arrangements, difficult at the best of times, are made even more
complex by the nature of cross-border cooperation. Cooperation between firms with
different and distinct technological competencies requires some common ground.
Second, the nature of technology development and R&D adds a unique twist. In most
cases, tariff and non-tariff barriers do not effect these activities, since they involve
the development and implementation of knowledge, which is highly tacit and em-
bodied in highly skilled personnel. Such activities, especially where they are in more
basic, non-market related aspects are not effected by the SEM initiative since few, if
any, barriers have existed to the movement of skilled personnel and embodied infor-
mation. (Unlike applied R&D, which is necessarily located close to production sites
and therefore is effected by the SEM initiative).
Third, globalisation is a more powerful force than economic integration within any
one region, even if it is, as a bloc, the largest single economic entity on the planet.
The fact is that there is a growing convergence of income and consumption patterns,
as well as types of technologies used, and this is occurring across all countries within
the Triad. Several studies have shown that firms are competing and growing in order
to compete with other firms in the same industry, regardless of their nationality
(Cantwell and Sanna Randaccio 1990). The same is true for STP, where firms are
interested in partnering with other firms in the same industry, regardless of their na-
tionality, but on their relative qualities as a partner, and the nature of their techno-
logical competitiveness (Narula and Hagedoorn 1997).  The failure of the framework
programmes to create a European oligopoly is gratifying, for it shows that market
forces are stronger than central planning. Strange’s recent comments (1998) regard-
ing ‘Who are EU’ are appropriate here. The attempt of the commission to try and ex-
clude so-called non-EU firms from European consortia, and to create exclusive
European oligopolies are based on an antiquated assumption that only firms of his-
toric European nationality can contribute significantly to the competitiveness of
European industry and the welfare of Europe. In a globalised world, attempting any
sort of industrial policy based on national exclusion is sure to be sub-optimal.
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Appendix
The cooperative agreements and technology indicators (CATI)
information system
The CATI data bank is a relational database which contains separate data files that
can be linked to each other and provide (des)aggregate and combined information
from several files. The CATI database contains three major entities. The first entity
includes information on over 10,000 cooperative agreements involving some 4000
different parent companies. The data bank contains information on each agreement
and some information on companies participating in these agreements. We define
cooperative agreements as common interests between independent (industrial) part-
ners that are not connected through (majority) ownership. In the CATI database only
those inter-firm agreements are being collected, that contain some arrangements for
transferring technology or joint research. Joint research pacts, second-sourcing and
licensing agreements are clear-cut examples. We also collect information on joint
ventures in which new technology is received from at least one of the partners, or
joint ventures having some R&D program. Mere production or marketing joint ven-
tures are excluded. In other words, our analysis is primarily related to technology co-
operation. We are discussing those forms of cooperation and agreements for which a
combined innovative activity or an exchange of technology is at least part of the
agreement. Consequently, partnerships are omitted that regulate no more than the
sharing of production facilities, the setting of standards, collusive behaviour in price-
setting and raising entry barriers - although all of these may be side effects of inter-
firm cooperation as we define it.
We regard as a relevant input of information for each alliance: the number of compa-
nies involved; names of companies (or important subsidiaries); year of establishment,
time-horizon, duration and year of dissolution; capital investments and involvement
of banks and research institutes or universities; field(s) of technology3; modes of co-
operation4; and some comment or available information about progress. Depending
on the very form of cooperation we collect information on the operational context;
the name of the agreement or project; equity sharing; the direction of capital or tech-
nology flows; the degree of participation in case of minority holdings; some infor-
mation about motives underlying the alliance; the character of cooperation, such as
                                                
3
 The most important fields in terms of frequency are information technology (computers, industrial
automation, telecommunications, software, microelectronics), biotechnology (with fields such as
pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology), new materials technology, chemicals, automotive, defence,
consumer electronics, heavy electrical equipment, food & beverages, etc. All fields have important
sub-fields.
4
 As principal modes of cooperation we regard equity joint ventures, joint R&D projects, technology
exchange agreements, minority and cross-holdings, particular customer-supplier relations, one-
directional technology flows. Each mode of cooperation has a number of particular categories.
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basic research, applied research, or product development possibly associated with
production and/or marketing arrangements. In some cases we also indicate who has
benefited most.
The second major entity is the individual subsidiary or parent company involved in
one (registered) alliance at least. In the first place we assess the company’s coopera-
tive strategy by adding its alliances and computing its network centrality. Second, we
ascertain its nationality, its possible (majority) owner in case this is an industrial
firm, too. Changes in (majority) ownership in the eighties were also registered. Next,
we determine the main branch in which it is operating and classify its number of em-
ployees. In addition, for three separate subsets of firms time-series for employment,
turnover, net income, R&D expenditures and numbers of assigned US patents have
been stored. The first subset is based on the Business Week R&D scoreboard, the
second on Fortune’s International 500, and the third group was retrieved from the US
Department of Commerce’s patent tapes. From the Business Week R&D Scoreboard
we took R&D expenditure, net income, sales and number of employees. In 1980
some 750 companies were filed; during the next years this number gradually in-
creased up to 900 companies in 1988, which were spread among 40 industry groups.
The Fortune’s International 500 of the largest corporations outside the US provides
amongst others information about sales (upon which the rankings are based), net in-
come and number of employees.
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